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Fix: Potential Vulnerability in Cloned Function (#2087)
* Fix for #168 * Adapt style ecc_dsa.c * Update ecc_dsa.c
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@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ static void bits2int(uECC_word_t *native, const uint8_t *bits, unsigned bits_siz
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int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash, unsigned hash_size, uECC_word_t *k, uint8_t *signature, uECC_Curve curve) {
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uECC_word_t tmp[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
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uECC_word_t s[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
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uECC_word_t *k2[2] = {tmp, s};
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uECC_word_t *k2[2] = {tmp, s};
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uECC_word_t *initial_Z = 0;
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uECC_word_t p[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
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uECC_word_t carry;
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wordcount_t num_words = curve->num_words;
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@@ -113,7 +114,15 @@ int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash, un
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}
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carry = regularize_k(k, tmp, s, curve);
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EccPoint_mult(p, curve->G, k2[!carry], 0, num_n_bits + 1, curve);
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/* If an RNG function was specified, try to get a random initial Z value to improve
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protection against side-channel attacks. */
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if (g_rng_function) {
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if (!uECC_generate_random_int(k2[carry], curve->p, num_words)) {
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return 0;
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}
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initial_Z = k2[carry];
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}
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EccPoint_mult(p, curve->G, k2[!carry], initial_Z, num_n_bits + 1, curve);
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if (uECC_vli_isZero(p, num_words)) {
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return 0;
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}
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