Files
linux_media/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
Ondrej Mosnacek ee1a84fdfe selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance
Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen
and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new
entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM.

Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of
distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't
handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the
following reproducer:

    while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done &
    for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do
        runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break
        # or:
        # chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break
    done

This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during
policy reload, thus solving the above problem.

The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated
sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets
indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages:
  1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in
     logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups)
     and can still be done safely without locking.
  2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after
     acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be
     searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a
     new entry are now about twice as fast.
  3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible
     to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion.

The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up
to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about
4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32
entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point
the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway...

The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that
each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for
kmalloc() to handle.

Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent
logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the
hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries.

The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but
it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the
contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its
effectivity, not the correctness of lookups.

Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple
stress test:
```
function rand_cat() {
	echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}

function do_work() {
	while true; do
		echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
			>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
	done
}

do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &

while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done

kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```

Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38

Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com>
Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts]
[PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-12-05 16:12:32 -05:00

652 lines
16 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
*
* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
*
* Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*/
/*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
*
* Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
*
* (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "sidtab.h"
#include "mls.h"
#include "policydb.h"
#include "services.h"
/*
* Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
* security context string representation of `context'.
*/
int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
{
int i, l, len, head, prev;
char *nm;
struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
/* categories */
head = -2;
prev = -2;
e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
if (i - prev > 1) {
/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
if (head != prev) {
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
head = i;
}
prev = i;
}
if (prev != head) {
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
if (l == 0) {
if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
&context->range.level[1]))
break;
else
len++;
}
}
return len;
}
/*
* Write the security context string representation of
* the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
* Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
*/
void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
char **scontext)
{
char *scontextp, *nm;
int i, l, head, prev;
struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return;
scontextp = *scontext;
*scontextp = ':';
scontextp++;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
/* categories */
head = -2;
prev = -2;
e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
if (i - prev > 1) {
/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
if (prev != head) {
if (prev - head > 1)
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
if (prev < 0)
*scontextp++ = ':';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
head = i;
}
prev = i;
}
if (prev != head) {
if (prev - head > 1)
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
if (l == 0) {
if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
&context->range.level[1]))
break;
else
*scontextp++ = '-';
}
}
*scontext = scontextp;
return;
}
int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
{
struct level_datum *levdatum;
if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
return 0;
levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return 0;
/*
* Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in
* levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
* p->p_cats.nprim.
*/
return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
p->p_cats.nprim);
}
int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
{
return (mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) &&
mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[1]) &&
mls_level_dom(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]));
}
/*
* Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
* structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
*/
int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
{
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 1;
if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range))
return 0;
if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
return 1;
/*
* User must be authorized for the MLS range.
*/
if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
return 0;
usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
return 1;
}
/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context' based on the string representation in
* the string `scontext'.
*
* This function modifies the string in place, inserting
* NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
*
* If a def_sid is provided and no MLS field is present,
* copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
* Used for upgraded to MLS systems where objects may lack
* MLS fields.
*
* Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
*
*/
int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
char oldc,
char *scontext,
struct context *context,
struct sidtab *s,
u32 def_sid)
{
char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
int l, rc, i;
char *rangep[2];
if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
if ((def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc) || (*scontext) == '\0')
return 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* No MLS component to the security context, try and map to
* default if provided.
*/
if (!oldc) {
struct context *defcon;
if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
if (!defcon)
return -EINVAL;
return mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
}
/*
* If we're dealing with a range, figure out where the two parts
* of the range begin.
*/
rangep[0] = scontext;
rangep[1] = strchr(scontext, '-');
if (rangep[1]) {
rangep[1][0] = '\0';
rangep[1]++;
}
/* For each part of the range: */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
/* Split sensitivity and category set. */
sensitivity = rangep[l];
if (sensitivity == NULL)
break;
next_cat = strchr(sensitivity, ':');
if (next_cat)
*(next_cat++) = '\0';
/* Parse sensitivity. */
levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, sensitivity);
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
/* Extract category set. */
while (next_cat != NULL) {
cur_cat = next_cat;
next_cat = strchr(next_cat, ',');
if (next_cat != NULL)
*(next_cat++) = '\0';
/* Separate into range if exists */
rngptr = strchr(cur_cat, '.');
if (rngptr != NULL) {
/* Remove '.' */
*rngptr++ = '\0';
}
catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, cur_cat);
if (!catdatum)
return -EINVAL;
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
catdatum->value - 1, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* If range, set all categories in range */
if (rngptr == NULL)
continue;
rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr);
if (!rngdatum)
return -EINVAL;
if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
}
/* If we didn't see a '-', the range start is also the range end. */
if (rangep[1] == NULL) {
context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
&context->range.level[0].cat);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context' based on the string representation in
* the string `str'. This function will allocate temporary memory with the
* given constraints of gfp_mask.
*/
int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
char *tmpstr;
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
tmpstr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
if (!tmpstr) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
} else {
rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context,
NULL, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(tmpstr);
}
return rc;
}
/*
* Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
*/
int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
struct mls_range *range)
{
int l, rc = 0;
/* Copy the MLS range into the context */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
&range->level[l].cat);
if (rc)
break;
}
return rc;
}
int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
struct context *usercon)
{
if (p->mls_enabled) {
struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
/* Honor the user's default level if we can */
if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr))
*usercon_sen = *user_def;
else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr))
*usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def))
*usercon_sen = *user_low;
else
return -EINVAL;
/* Lower the clearance of available contexts
if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
that of the user's default clearance (but
only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
the user's computed sensitivity level) */
if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr))
*usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr))
*usercon_clr = *user_clr;
else
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Convert the MLS fields in the security context
* structure `oldc' from the values specified in the
* policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp',
* storing the resulting context in `newc'.
*/
int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
struct policydb *newp,
struct context *oldc,
struct context *newc)
{
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
int l, i;
if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
return 0;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
oldc->range.level[l].sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat,
node, i) {
int rc;
catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
if (!catdatum)
return -EINVAL;
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&newc->range.level[l].cat,
catdatum->value - 1, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
struct context *scontext,
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
u32 specified,
struct context *newcontext,
bool sock)
{
struct range_trans rtr;
struct mls_range *r;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
int default_range = 0;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
switch (specified) {
case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
/* Look for a range transition rule. */
rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
rtr.target_class = tclass;
r = hashtab_search(p->range_tr, &rtr);
if (r)
return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
if (cladatum)
default_range = cladatum->default_range;
}
switch (default_range) {
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
}
/* Fallthrough */
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
if ((tclass == p->process_class) || (sock == true))
/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
else
/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
case AVTAB_MEMBER:
/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
/* fall through */
}
return -EINVAL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into the
* NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
*
*/
void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return;
secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
}
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Given the security context and the NetLabel security attributes, copy the
* NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
*
*/
void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return;
context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
}
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Given the security context copy the low MLS categories into the NetLabel
* MLS category field. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
&secattr->attr.mls.cat);
if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL)
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
return rc;
}
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
* Description:
* Copy the NetLabel security attributes into the SELinux context; since the
* NetLabel security attribute only contains a single MLS category use it for
* both the low and high categories of the context. Returns zero on success,
* negative values on failure.
*
*/
int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
struct context *context,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return 0;
rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
secattr->attr.mls.cat);
if (rc)
goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
return 0;
import_netlbl_cat_failure:
ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */