Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a
  few changes worth highlighting:

   - Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead
     of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the
     full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it
     safely (missing information on the address family).

     This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team
     netdev) and James Morris (representing team
     LSMs-other-than-SELinux).

   - Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we
     attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of
     continuing to treat it as unlabeled.

   - Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx
     SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are
     effective even without the allowx statement.

  Everything passes our test suite"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
  selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
  selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
  selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
  selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx
  selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
-	struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
 	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
 	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 			return rc;
 	}
 	if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
-		struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
+		struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
 		seq_putc(m, ',');
 		seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
@@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
 			 * be used again by userspace.
 			 */
-			goto out;
+			goto out_invalid;
 		}
 
 		rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
@@ -1508,7 +1508,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			 * could be used again by userspace.
 			 */
 			if (!dentry)
-				goto out;
+				goto out_invalid;
 			rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
 						   sbsec->flags, &sid);
 			if (rc) {
@@ -1533,11 +1533,10 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 out:
 	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
 	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
-		if (!sid || rc) {
+		if (rc) {
 			isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
-
 		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 		isec->sid = sid;
 	}
@@ -1545,6 +1544,15 @@ out:
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
 	return rc;
+
+out_invalid:
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
+		isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
@@ -2560,7 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 	spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
-	sbsec->sb = sb;
 	sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 	sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -4029,6 +4036,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 	switch (id) {
 	case LOADING_MODULE:
 		rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+		break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -5429,9 +5437,9 @@ static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
-				      struct flowi *fl)
+				      struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
-	fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
+	flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
 }
 
 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)

security/selinux/include/objsec.h

@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ struct file_security_struct {
 };
 
 struct superblock_security_struct {
-	struct super_block *sb;		/* back pointer to sb object */
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of file system superblock */
 	u32 def_sid;			/* default SID for labeling */
 	u32 mntpoint_sid;		/* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */

security/selinux/include/xfrm.h

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-				      const struct flowi *fl);
+				      const struct flowi_common *flic);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -596,9 +596,7 @@ void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
 					node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
 	}
 
-	/* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
-	if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
-		xperms->len = 1;
+	xperms->len = 1;
 }
 
 /*

security/selinux/xfrm.c

@@ -175,9 +175,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-				      const struct flowi *fl)
+				      const struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
 	u32 state_sid;
+	u32 flic_sid;
 
 	if (!xp->security)
 		if (x->security)
@@ -196,17 +197,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				return 0;
 
 	state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
+	flic_sid = flic->flowic_secid;
 
-	if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
+	if (flic_sid != state_sid)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
 	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
 	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
-	return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-			     fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
-			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+	return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, flic_sid, state_sid,
+			     SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+			     NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
 
 static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)