mirror of
https://github.com/tbsdtv/linux_media.git
synced 2025-07-23 12:43:29 +02:00
maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read
Except for historical confusion in the kprobes/uprobes and bpf tracers, which has been fixed now, there is no good reason to ever allow user memory accesses from probe_kernel_read. Switch probe_kernel_read to only read from kernel memory. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: update it for "mm, dump_page(): do not crash with invalid mapping pointer"] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-17-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Linus Torvalds
parent
7676fbf21b
commit
98a23609b1
40
mm/maccess.c
40
mm/maccess.c
@@ -6,36 +6,13 @@
|
||||
#include <linux/mm.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
||||
|
||||
static long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size,
|
||||
bool strict);
|
||||
|
||||
bool __weak probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size,
|
||||
bool strict)
|
||||
bool __weak probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from any location
|
||||
* @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
|
||||
* @src: address to read from
|
||||
* @size: size of the data chunk
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Same as probe_kernel_read_strict() except that for architectures with
|
||||
* not fully separated user and kernel address spaces this function also works
|
||||
* for user address tanges.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* DO NOT USE THIS FUNCTION - it is broken on architectures with entirely
|
||||
* separate kernel and user address spaces, and also a bad idea otherwise.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return __probe_kernel_read(dst, src, size, false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_kernel_read);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* probe_kernel_read_strict(): safely attempt to read from kernel-space
|
||||
* probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from kernel-space
|
||||
* @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
|
||||
* @src: address to read from
|
||||
* @size: size of the data chunk
|
||||
@@ -48,18 +25,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_kernel_read);
|
||||
* probe_kernel_read() suitable for use within regions where the caller
|
||||
* already holds mmap_lock, or other locks which nest inside mmap_lock.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
long probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return __probe_kernel_read(dst, src, size, true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size,
|
||||
bool strict)
|
||||
long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
long ret;
|
||||
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!probe_kernel_read_allowed(src, size, strict))
|
||||
if (!probe_kernel_read_allowed(src, size))
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
|
||||
@@ -73,6 +44,7 @@ static long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size,
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_kernel_read);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* probe_user_read(): safely attempt to read from a user-space location
|
||||
@@ -181,7 +153,7 @@ long strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
|
||||
|
||||
if (unlikely(count <= 0))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!probe_kernel_read_allowed(unsafe_addr, count, true))
|
||||
if (!probe_kernel_read_allowed(unsafe_addr, count))
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user