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maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read
Except for historical confusion in the kprobes/uprobes and bpf tracers, which has been fixed now, there is no good reason to ever allow user memory accesses from probe_kernel_read. Switch probe_kernel_read to only read from kernel memory. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: update it for "mm, dump_page(): do not crash with invalid mapping pointer"] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-17-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Linus Torvalds
parent
7676fbf21b
commit
98a23609b1
@@ -301,11 +301,9 @@ copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize, const void __user *src,
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return 0;
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}
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bool probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size,
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bool strict);
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bool probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size);
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extern long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
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extern long probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
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extern long probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size);
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extern long notrace probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
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