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Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra: "Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen), which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself" [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html * tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits) kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0 x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0 kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions objtool: Validate IBT assumptions objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation x86: Annotate idtentry_df() x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h x86: Annotate call_on_stack() objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto ...
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@@ -265,7 +265,6 @@ extern int arch_init_kprobes(void);
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extern void kprobes_inc_nmissed_count(struct kprobe *p);
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extern bool arch_within_kprobe_blacklist(unsigned long addr);
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extern int arch_populate_kprobe_blacklist(void);
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extern bool arch_kprobe_on_func_entry(unsigned long offset);
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extern int kprobe_on_func_entry(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, const char *sym, unsigned long offset);
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extern bool within_kprobe_blacklist(unsigned long addr);
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@@ -384,6 +383,8 @@ static inline struct kprobe_ctlblk *get_kprobe_ctlblk(void)
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}
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kprobe_opcode_t *kprobe_lookup_name(const char *name, unsigned int offset);
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kprobe_opcode_t *arch_adjust_kprobe_addr(unsigned long addr, unsigned long offset, bool *on_func_entry);
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int register_kprobe(struct kprobe *p);
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void unregister_kprobe(struct kprobe *p);
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int register_kprobes(struct kprobe **kps, int num);
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