mirror of
https://github.com/tbsdtv/linux_media.git
synced 2025-07-23 20:51:03 +02:00
exec: Compute file based creds only once
Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -44,18 +44,18 @@
|
||||
* request libc enable secure mode.
|
||||
* @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
|
||||
* Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
|
||||
* @bprm_repopulate_creds:
|
||||
* Assuming that the relevant bits of @bprm->cred->security have been
|
||||
* previously set, examine @bprm->file and regenerate them. This is
|
||||
* so that the credentials derived from the interpreter the code is
|
||||
* actually going to run are used rather than credentials derived
|
||||
* from a script. This done because the interpreter binary needs to
|
||||
* reopen script, and may end up opening something completely different.
|
||||
* This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
|
||||
* transitions between security domains).
|
||||
* The hook must set @bprm->active_secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to
|
||||
* @bprm_creds_from_file:
|
||||
* If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change
|
||||
* privilege upon exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change.
|
||||
* This is called after finding the binary that will be executed.
|
||||
* without an interpreter. This ensures that the credentials will not
|
||||
* be derived from a script that the binary will need to reopen, which
|
||||
* when reopend may end up being a completely different file. This
|
||||
* hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for transitions
|
||||
* between security domains).
|
||||
* The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to
|
||||
* request libc enable secure mode.
|
||||
* The hook must add to @bprm->pf_per_clear any personality flags that
|
||||
* The hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that
|
||||
* should be cleared from current->personality.
|
||||
* @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
|
||||
* Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user